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ATTRACTION AND  LIMITATIONS OF THE
FOCUS ON INNOCENCE IN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT  LAW AND ADVOCACY
CAROL S. STEIKER"  & JORDAN M. STEIKER**
INTRODUCTION
Over  the  past  five  years  we  have  seen  an  unprecedented  swell  of
debate  at  all  levels  of public  life  regarding  the  American  death  penalty.
Much of the  debate  centers  on the  crisis  of confidence  engendered  by the
high-profile  release  of a significant  number  of wrongly  convicted  inmates
from the nation's  death rows.  Advocates  for reform or abolition of capital
punishment  have  seized upon  this issue  to promote  various  public  policy
initiatives to address the crisis, including proposals for more complete DNA
collection and testing, procedural reforms in capital cases, substantive  limits
on  the  use  of capital punishment,  suspension  of executions,  and  outright
abolition.  Advocates  for  the  retention  and  vigorous  use  of  capital
punishment have been sympathetic  to some,  but by no means  all, of these
proposals.  Disagreement  over  the  nature  and  scope  of responses  to  the
crisis has inevitably  and quite properly  led to debate about the significance
of the wrongful  conviction  of the innocent  in the administration  of capital
punishment.
This  symposium presents  two common criticisms  of the current  focus
on innocence in the debate over the death penalty in America-one  from an
"agnostic"  on the issue of capital punishment and one from a whole-hearted
supporter.  Professor Ron Allen, the self-described  agnostic, along with his
co-author  Amy  Shavell, makes  the  argument  often made by  supporters  of
capital  punishment  that  there  is nothing  distinctive  about  the problem  of
wrongful  death in the capital punishment  context.  Rather, the execution  of
*  Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
**  Cooper K. Ragan Regents  Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law.CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M  STEIKER
some  innocent  people  is  simply  the  unavoidable  cost  of implementing
capital  punishment  and  thus  is  comparable  to  the  foreseeable  deaths  that
occur  whenever  the  government  undertakes  an  important  social  project,
such  as building  a bridge or constructing  a dam.'  Joshua Marquis,  a vocal
and high-profile  supporter of capital punishment,  criticizes  those who focus
on the problem of innocence in the death penalty  debate for overstating  the
problem  by  overestimating  the  actual  number  of  completely  innocent
people  convicted  and  sentenced  to  die.  According  to  Marquis,  the  true
number, while  not zero,  is low enough to constitute  an acceptable  cost of a
valuable social policy.
2
Although it  is not our focus in this paper to refute  them, we  think that
these common  critiques of innocence are deeply flawed.  Allen  & Shavell's
critique  completely  misses  at  least  two  distinctive  harms  that  flow  from
executing the  innocent.  First, unlike the innocent victims  of governmental
bridge-building,  those  who  are innocent  and  sentenced  to  death  suffer  the
additional  devastation  of being  blamed  for  a  terrible  crime;  their  names,
families,  and  entire  lives  are forever tainted by such  ignominy, quite  apart
from the death of their bodies.  Moreover, when such errors are discovered,
as  some  but  by  no  means  all  of  them  eventually  will  be,  they  deeply
undermine  the  legitimacy of the  entire criminal justice system.  This  latter
cost,  though  unquantifiable,  is  tremendously  important.  Public  fear  of
unjust  violence  at  the  hands  of the  state,  which  has  a  monopoly  on  the
legitimate  use  of force,  is the  hallmark  of totalitarian  regimes,  one of the
indices  that  most  distinguish  them  from  free  and  democratic  societies.
There  is thus ample  reason to weigh erroneous  executions quite  differently
from unavoidable deaths in the regulatory context.
We  are  more  sympathetic  to  Marquis's  argument  about  exactly  who
should  count as  an  "innocent"  person,  but we  find the  conclusion  that  he
draws  from his  revised number equally  flawed.  Marquis  claims that if we
apply  a  more  rigorous  definition  of  innocence-such  as  "had  no
involvement  in  the  [crime],  wasn't  there,  didn't  do  it"3-the  number  of
wrongly convicted and sentenced to die goes down to twenty-five or thirty,
out  of the  7000  murderers  sentenced  to  death  since  1976.  Such  a  ratio,
argues  Marquis,  represents  an  episodic  rather  than  epidemic  rate of error.
1 See Ronald J. Allen &  Amy Shavell, Further  Reflections on the Guillotine,  95  J. CRIM.
L.  &  CRIMINOLOGY  625  (2005);  see also Ernest  van  den  Haag,  The Death Penalty Once
More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957,  967 (1985);  Stephen Markman & Paul Cassell, Protecting
the Innocent: A  Response  to  the Bedau-Radelet Study,  41  STAN.  L.  REV.  121,  160  n.217
(1988)  (endorsing and expanding upon van den Haag's argument).
2 See  Joshua  Marquis,  The  Myth  of Innocence, 95  J.  CRIM.  L.  &  CRIMINOLOGY  501
(2005).
3 Seeid. at 519.
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The  problem with  Marquis'  argument  is  that, even  if we  completely  grant
him his revised numerator, he is using the wrong denominator.  It is simply
not the case that all  7000 capital  convictions have been subject to the same
kind  of scrutiny.  The  twenty-five  or  thirty  exonerations  (by  Marquis's
count)  largely  derive  from  a much  smaller  subset of cases  in which there
was  significant  postconviction  scrutiny  of the  accuracy  of the underlying
conviction,  such  as cases  involving preserved  and testable DNA  evidence.
That  such  a  significant  fraction  of these cases  turned  out to  be  erroneous
suggests by extrapolation  that the  number of erroneous  convictions  in the
entire set is much larger than Marquis  allows and thus is not a number that
we should accept with regretful equanimity.
Despite our profound disagreement  with these  two arguments  against
innocence,  we have our own discomfort with  the prominence  of innocence
in  the  current  debate  about  capital  punishment.  In  what  follows,  we
articulate  and  develop  a  different  set  of  concerns  about  the  focus  on
innocence, concerns that derive from a perspective sympathetic to reform or
abolition of the death  penalty.  Our discussion  proceeds  in  three parts.  In
Part I, we offer an explanation for why innocence has become  so prominent
in the debate over the death penalty  at this point in time (and why it played
such a minor role in the earlier debate of the  1960s and '70s).  In Part II, we
question  the  normative  distinctiveness  of innocence  as  a problem  in  the
administration  of  capital  punishment  in  comparison  with  other,  more
endemic  problems,  such  as  disproportionate,  arbitrary,  or  discriminatory
imposition  of capital  punishment.  In  Part  III,  we  question  the  strategic
value  of focusing  on  innocence  in the  effort  to  reform  or  abolish  capital
punishment.  In what follows,  we  seek to  question and at least qualify  the
apparently widespread assumption that the execution of the innocent is both
the worst  problem that the administration  of capital punishment  faces and
the  best  strategic  hope  for  reform  or  abolition  of  the  death  penalty  in
America.
I.  MOMENTS  OF REFORM  IN THE MODERN ERA OF THE AMERICAN  DEATH
PENALTY
At the present time, the United States  is fairly regarded  as an outlier in
its enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty.4  Most Western countries have
abolished the death penalty altogether  and few of the retentionist countries
around  the  world  are  active  in  carrying  out  executions.  In  light  of this
present moment,  it  is easy  to  overlook  the  more  complicated  story of the
4 Carol  S.  Steiker, Capital  Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81  OR.  L. REv.  97
(2002).
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American  death  penalty.  In its early  history,  the  United  States was  at the
forefront  of  death  penalty  reform.  Almost  immediately  after  the
Constitution was ratified, many states sought to limit the perceived excesses
of capital  punishment.  By  the  early  nineteenth  century,  states  generally
reduced  the number of crimes punishable by  death  to  a handful  of crimes
whereas  England  recognized  over  200  capital  offenses.5  The  reformist
impulse  was  also  manifest  in  states'  efforts  to  limit  the  automatic
application  of the death penalty  for murder.  First, many states developed a
hierarchy  of murder,  distinguishing  between  "degrees"  of the  crime  such
that only  "first  degree"  murder  could  generate  a capital  sentence.  Later,
states gravitated  toward discretionary sentencing even with respect to those
defendants  convicted  of murder  in  the first  degree.  By the  mid-twentieth
century,  virtually  all  American  jurisdictions  retaining  the  death  penalty
afforded jurors substantial  discretion  to withhold  the punishment  based on
circumstances of the offense and offender.6
Notwithstanding  these  reforms,  the  death  penalty  has  occupied  an
important  practical  and  symbolic  role  in  the  American  criminal  justice
system.  Substantial  numbers  of  executions  have  been  carried  out
throughout  our history,  including  a  decade  high of over  1500  during  the
1930s.7  The  death penalty has  also occupied  a peculiar-and undoubtedly
significant-role  in  American  race  relations  and  American  politics  more
generally.  The  American  death  penalty  has  disproportionately  targeted
African-American  offenders  (both  as  a  matter  of law  in  the  antebellum
South  and  as  matter  of practice  throughout  our history8),  and  executions
(including  extralegal  executions-lynchings)  have  been  an  important
mechanism  for subordinating African-Americans,  particularly  in the period
between  Reconstruction  and  the  modem  era.  Perhaps  because  of  its
connection to race, the death penalty has received extraordinary  attention in
electoral  politics at both the local and national levels, despite the absence of
a  significant  federal  death  penalty.  Overall,  the  broad  history  of  the
American  death penalty  reflects  a  deep ambivalence  about the wisdom and
role  of  the  death  penalty,  and  the  two  centuries  separating  early
amelioration  and modem  robustness  saw  alternating  waves of reform  and
retrenchment.
The modem era has  seen two significant reformist  moments.  The  first
began  in  the early  1960s  as the  number of executions  drastically  fell and
advocates of reform and abolition looked to the federal courts-particularly
5  STUART BANNER,  THE DEATH PENALTY:  AN AMERICAN HISTORY 89-100 (2002).
6  WILLIAM J.  BOWERS, EXECUTIONS  IN AMERICA  8  (1974).
7 Id. at 40.
8  See BANNER, supra  note  5, at 141  (discussing discriminatory  statutes and practices).
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the United States Supreme Court-to limit or abolish the death penalty.9  In
retrospect, the  1960s look like a "perfect storm" for restricting or abolishing
the death penalty.  The Civil Rights movement reached its peak in the early
1960s  with the passage  of the  Civil Rights Act  of 1964.  Concerns  about
racial  discrimination  and the  death  penalty had pushed  the NAACP  Legal
Defense  Fund  to  the  forefront  of  anti-death  penalty  efforts,' 0  and  the
Southern  face  of  the  death  penalty-executions  were  increasingly
marginalized  to  southern  and  border  states-naturally  made  capital
punishment  a target  for groups  concerned  about racial justice.  Given  this
context,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  United  States  Supreme  Court's  first
significant  gesture  toward the  constitutional regulation of the death penalty
was  the  statement  of  three  Justices  that  the  Court  should  consider  the
constitutionality of the death penalty for the crime of rape."  All of the 455
executions  for rape  after  1930  in  the  United  States  occurred  in  southern
states, border  states, and  the  District  of Columbia,  and  an  overwhelming
number  of  those  executions  involved  African-American  defendants  and
white victims.12
Popular support for the  death penalty  also dropped to  an all-time low
in the mid-1960s, 3 as the Vietnam War stirred an unprecedented  skepticism
about  the  capacity  of governmental  institutions  to  act  in  a  humane  and
benign manner.  As the general social upheaval reached its height in the late
1960s, and  executions had ceased  as a result of a de facto moratorium,  the
death  penalty  seemed  high  on  the  list  of  orthodoxies  ripe  for
reconsideration.
On the  legal front, the  1960s saw an explosion of decisions expanding
the  federal  constitutional  rights  of state  criminal  defendants.  Throughout
the  late  1950s  and  1960s,  the  Warren  Court  recognized  new  procedural
protections  within the Bill of Rights  and extended those protections to state
trials that  had previously  been held only  to a generalized  guarantee of due
process.  Among  the  newly  extended rights-and  the  most  substantive  in
9  See  MICHAEL  MELTSNER,  CRUEL  AND  UNUSUAL:  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AND  CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT  (1973)  (describing strategy of death penalty  reformers during the  1960s).
10 See generally id.
11  See  Rudolph  v.  Alabama,  375  U.S.  889,  889-91  (1963)  (Goldberg,  J.,  joined  by
Douglas and Brennan,  JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
12  Marvin  E.  Wolfgang,  Race  Discrimination in  the  Death  Sentence for  Rape,  in
BOWERS, supra note 6, at 113.
13  Carol  Steiker & Jordan  Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109  HARv.  L. REv.  355,  410  (1995)
("[T]he  1966 Gallup poll turned out to be the only Gallup  poll on the death penalty question
out of 21  such polls conducted between  1936 and  1986  in which more  people opposed than
supported the death  penalty for murder ..  ") (citation omitted).
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nature-was  the  Eighth  Amendment's  prohibition  of Cruel  and  Unusual
Punishments,  a guarantee  that had not been applied to  invalidate  state  laws
or practices  before  1962. 4
In this context,  the central critiques  of the death penalty  focused on its
declining popular support and its arbitrary and inequitable  distribution.  The
infrequency  of executions  suggested that the  law on  the  books  might  not
reflect  genuine  societal  views.  In  light  of the  broad  discretion  afforded
prosecutors  and  jurors,  there  was  also  the  fear  that  the  few  offenders
sentenced  to  death  (or  actually  executed)  were  selected  for  arbitrary  or
perhaps discriminatory reasons.
When  the  Supreme  Court struck  down  state  death  penalty  statutes  in
Furman v. Georgia'5 in  1972,  it focused precisely  on these  two  concerns.
All  five  of the  Justices  supporting  the decision  expressed  concerns  about
arbitrariness, pointing to the absence of safeguards or procedures that would
ensure  the fair  selection  of the  condemned.  In  this  respect,  the  decision
carried  forward  the  Warren  Court's faith  that  legal  and  social  institutions
could  be  improved  with  additional  process.  Notably,  the  opinions
expressed  less  concern  about  those  who had been  selected  for death  than
those  who  had  been  spared.  Justice  White  expressed  doubts  about  the
capacity  of the  death penalty  to  achieve  the  social  goals  of deterrence  or
retribution given the paucity of executions, 16 and Justice  Stewart  alluded to
the  numerous  offenders  convicted  of  equally  reprehensible  rapes  and
murders  who  had  not  been  death-sentenced. 17  Emphasizing  the  "'caste'
aspect" of the American  death penalty  system, 18 Justice Douglas compared
the treatment of wealthy  defendants  to the  exemption  of Brahmans  under
ancient Hindu law, almost lamenting "the ability of the rich to purchase the
services  of  the  most  respected  and  most  resourceful  legal  talent  in  the
Nation."' 9
A  clear  though  subordinate  theme  of  the  opinions  was  that  the
infrequency  of executions cast doubt on America's genuine commitment  to
the death penalty.  Justice Brennan made this  argument explicitly,  insisting
that  "[w]hen  an unusually  severe  punishment  is  authorized  for wide-scale
application  but  not,  because  of society's  refusal,  inflicted  save  in  a  few
14 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.  660 (1962)  (invalidating  California statute  as applied
criminalizing the status of being addicted to the use of narcotics).
1"  408 U.S.  238 (1972).
16 Id. at 313  (White,  J.,  concurring) ("[T]he  penalty  is so  infrequently  imposed that the
threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice .....
17 Id. at 309 (Stewart,  J.,  concurring).
18  Id. at 255 (Douglas,  J., concurring).
19  Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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instances, the inference  is compelling that there is a deep-seated  reluctance
to  inflict  it." ° 20  Justice  Brennan would  have constitutionally  abolished the
death penalty on this ground, with  Justice Marshall  agreeing that the  death
penalty was no longer consistent with public values.  Even the Justices who
held  out the possibility  of saving capital  punishment  with  new procedural
safeguards  were  careful  to  defend  their  decision  against  the  counter-
majoritarian  critique  by observing that the "legislative  will is not frustrated
if the penalty is never imposed.",
21
In this reformist  moment  spurred  by declining  executions,  the  Court
paid virtually no attention to the risk of executing  innocents as an argument
against the death penalty.  Although the  five Justices in the majority wrote
lengthy,  wide-ranging  opinions  occupying  almost  200  pages  in the  U.S.
Reports,  this  concern  is  significantly  raised  only by Justice  Marshall  and
then only as the  last of numerous  considerations  that might  turn informed
public opinion against the death penalty.
22
States  responded  quickly  to  Furman by  amending  their  statutes  to
address the  defects  of unbridled discretion.23  These  newly-crafted  statutes
put to rest the claim that death penalty  provisions had fallen into desuetude
and reflected an outdated morality.  In the decade after Furman, the Court's
regulatory efforts focused primarily on the sort of guidance required in state
schemes  (through  the  enumeration  of aggravating  factors)  as  well  as  the
competing  interest  in preserving  sentencer  discretion  to consider  and give
effect to a defendant's mitigating evidence.24
Of course,  to  meet Justice  White's  concerns,  it  was  not  enough  for
jurors to be  clearly informed of the characteristics  of the  "worst" murders;
states had to  generate  significant numbers of death verdicts and executions
so  that  it could  truly  be  said that  the  death  penalty  was  achieving  social
goals.  Although the Court never explicitly insisted on increased production
in  this  regard,  the  rapid  growth  of death  row  in  the  three  decades  post-
Furman, as well as the willingness and ability of some death penalty states
to  carry  out  executions,  undoubtedly  has  solidified  the  death  penalty's
constitutional status in the recent era.
20  Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2  Id. at  311  (White,  J.,  concurring)  (describing  legislative  delegation  of discretion  to
judges  and jurors as  sentencers  such  that the  absence of death  sentences  is not  contrary to
legislative policy); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Justice White).
22 Id.  at 366-67 (Marshall, J.,  concurring).
23 See Steiker & Steiker, supra  note  13,  at 410.
24  Id. at 371-403.
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When Furman  addressed  the constitutionality of capital punishment in
1972,  the national death  row numbered  in the  600S,25 and states conducted
twenty-one  executions  during  the  period  1965-1983.26  Thirty  years  after
Furman, the  national death  row had  climbed over  3500,  with  California's
death row (613)  about as large as the nation's death row at the time Furman
was  decided. 27   Executions  reached  a post-Furman yearly  peak  in  1999
(ninety-eight)28 and  there  have  been  933  executions  nationwide  over  the
past two decades (1984-2004).29
We  are  now  in  the  midst  of the  second  reformist  moment  in  the
modern  era  in  which  the  death  penalty  itself  seems  ripe  for  significant
reform, if not wholesale  reconsideration.  The  driving concern is the risk of
death-sentencing  and executing  innocents.  This issue  emerged  as lawyers
and  journalists  brought  to  light  numerous  instances  of  innocents
erroneously  sentenced  to death.30  In Illinois,  one  inmate,  Anthony Porter,
had  come  perilously  close  to  execution  before  journalism  students
discovered  the  actual perpetrator  of his  crime.31  The circumstances  of his
case and the investigation made clear that it was entirely a matter of fortuity
that  Porter  had  not  been  executed  before  his  innocence  was  established.
Ultimately,  the  Chicago  Tribune  detailed systemic  problems in the Illinois
criminal  justice  system  traceable  in  part  to  prosecutorial  misconduct.32
Following the publicity in Porter's case, the discovery of other innocents on
Illinois's  death  row,  and  the journalistic  account  of rampant  prosecutorial
misconduct,  Republican Governor  George  Ryan  declared  a moratorium  on
executions.
At  the  same  time,  new  developments  in  DNA  technology  made  it
possible  to  reevaluate  evidence  in  dormant  cases-particularly  sex
offenses-leading  to  the  exoneration  of  both  capital  and  non-capital
25  Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.
php?scid=15&did=410#SuspendingtheDeathPenalty  (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
26  Id. at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146  (indicating eleven
executions  between  1976-1985  inclusive);  Bowers,  supra note  6,  at  23  (indicating  ten
executions  for  the  period  1965-1967);  Death  Penalty  Info.  Ctr.  website,  at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=l  5&did=410#SuspendingtheDeathPenalty
(describing ten year moratorium between  1967-1977).
27  Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid  9&did= 188#year.
28  Id. at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146.
29  Id.
30  Ronald Tabak, Finality Without Fairness:  Why  We are Moving Towards Moratoria  on
Executions, and the Potential  Abolition of Capital  Punishment, 33  CONN.  L. REv. 733,  739-
41(2001).
31  Id. at 739.
32  Id. at 740.
[Vol. 95THE SEDUCTION OF  INNOCENCE
prisoners.  The 2000 publication of Actual Innocence,33 which recounted the
efforts  of Barry  Scheck  and Peter Neufeld, pioneers  in the post-conviction
use of DNA to uncover  erroneous convictions, contributed to the mounting
perception that our criminal justice  system was fallible even in, and perhaps
especially  in,  capital  cases.  Over the past five  years,  public  and political
attention  to  the  American  system  of capital  punishment  has  equaled  and
perhaps surpassed the scrutiny of the Furman era.
At  first  glance  the  emergent  heightened  concerns  about  the  death
penalty  seem perfectly  understandable  in light of the discovery of wrongly
convicted  and in some cases death-sentenced inmates.  On the other hand, it
seems  odd that this issue  should have so much more traction today than in
the past.  The  fear of executing  innocents  has  surfaced numerous  times in
American history, and the argument about the fallibility of human judgment
has always been present in the larger moral debate  about the death penalty.
Indeed, in the early  1990s, there was little public attention or outrage when
the  Supreme  Court  was  faced  with  the  provocative  question  whether  the
Constitution prohibited the execution of the actually innocent.34  The "real"
question of the case was  a procedural  one: whether  states were  required to
afford  death-sentenced  inmates  a  vehicle  for  litigating  newly-discovered
evidence  of innocence.35  Perhaps because  the  inmate  raising  the question
had not convincingly  established  his innocence,  the  case was  greeted  as a
non-event.  Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in announcing the judgment  of
the  Court,  was  almost  cavalier  in  rejecting  the  notion  that  courts-as
opposed  to executive  officials  exercising  their clemency powers-had any
obligation  to  correct convictions  "merely"  because  the  wrong  person  had
been condemned in the absence of some separate constitutional violation.36
It is hard to imagine the same sort of opinion being written today, and
the question we address in this paper is whether the changed climate reflects
a new wisdom  about the significance of the possibility of error in the death
penalty  debate.  From a normative perspective,  is the problem  of wrongful
convictions  powerfully different from other sorts of challenges  to the death
penalty?  In  the  second  half of our  piece,  we  address  the  practical  and
strategic issues-whether  the focus  on innocence  is a prudent path  toward
reform  or  abolition  of  the  death  penalty,  and  whether  such  a  focus
33  Jim  DWYER  ET  AL.,  ACTUAL  INNOCENCE:  FIVE  DAYS  TO  EXECUTION  AND  OTHER
DISPATCHES  FROM THE WRONGLY  CONVICTED (2000).
34  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
35  See  id. at  420  (O'Connor,  J.,  concurring)  (describing  issue  as  "whether  a  fairly
convicted  and  therefore  legally  guilty  person  is  constitutionally  entitled  to  yet  another
judicial proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew").
36  Herrera, 506  U.S.  at  408-15  (detailing arguments  against  recognizing  constitutional
right to post-conviction forum in this context).
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undermines  or  reinforces  reform  in  the  criminal  justice  system  more
generally.  Here, though, we'd like to examine  and question what appears to
be a central premise  of the "innocence  movement"--that  the possibility of
executing  innocents  is  of greater  normative  concern  than  other  kinds  of
error  in capital  punishment  and thus  offers a comparatively  stronger  basis
for abolition or reform of the death penalty.
II.  THE APPEAL OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE
We  all  recoil  at  the  prospect  of executing  "actual  innocents."  This
reflexive revulsion is obviously justified, but it is nonetheless important and
valuable to specify the nature and degree of harm associated with punishing
innocents.  After all,  virtually every  socially valuable endeavor carries with
it the risk of harm, and it is fair to ask whether the risks (or ultimate harms)
in the  end are justified.  Virtually  all would agree  that  it is better  that  one
guilty person go free (or be spared execution) to prevent the incarceration or
execution  of an  innocent;  but  at  some  point  the  numbers  matter.37  The
distinctive claim of the newly  emerging "innocence  movement"  is that the
harms  associated  with executing  innocents  are  of such  a different  kind  or
degree that we should not risk these sorts of errors even as we must tolerate
others.
There  are  six  prominent  arguments  for  the  special  wrongness  of
executing  the  innocent.  First,  such  punishment  generates  an  enormous
retributive  gap  between  the  individual's  culpability  (none)  and  the
punishment  received  (death).  Second,  the false  conviction of an  innocent
leaves unpunished  the true  offender, creating  an additional  retributive  gap
and perhaps risking the safety of others if the real culprit remains free to re-
offend.  Third,  the  failure  to  punish  the  true  offender,  if known  to  the
community, undermines  general  deterrence.  Fourth, the punishment of the
innocent coupled with  the  failure to punish the  guilty  causes  a  loss to the
legitimacy  of  the  criminal  justice  system-a  loss  that  could  have
consequences  not  only  for  society's  effort  to  prevent  crime  and  achieve
justice,  but  also for  the  capacity  of government  to  be  successful  in  other
areas of social policy.  Fifth, the punishment of innocents  involves a special
sort of cruelty  because the  innocent offender, as  he awaits and receives his
punishment,  knows  that  the  punishment is  undeserved.  Lastly,  executing
(as  opposed  to  incarcerating)  innocents  includes  the  additional  harm  of
irrevocability.
37  For a whimsical  treatment  of the  appropriate denominator,  see Alexander  Volokh,  n
Guilty  Men,  146  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  173  (1997)  (detailing  varying  formulations  of  the
Blackstonian  declaration,  "'Better  that  ten  guilty  persons  escape,  than  that  one  innocent
suffer')  (quoting 4  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  *352).
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Each  of  these  harms  is  undoubtedly  significant  and  in  some  sense
vindicates the  intuitive  horror of punishing  (and  especially  executing)  the
innocent.  We  believe,  though,  that  the  case  for  the  normative
distinctiveness  of this  danger might  be  overstated.  Other  sorts of error in
the  criminal  justice  system,  including  arbitrary  and  unequal  treatment  of
offenders  as well  as  disproportionate  punishment  of the "guilty,"  generate
similar  harms.  Moreover,  even  if the  punishment  or  execution  of the
innocent  can be  said  to  cause  harms  of a different  degree  if not kind,  we
believe that the comparative  prevalence  of other injustices suggests that the
risk  of  executing  innocents  might  deserve  less  attention  than  other
normative claims  against the death  penalty; in short, such errors might well
be  worse  when  they happen  but  collectively  they  are  not  necessarily  the
worst part of our capital punishment system.  Lastly, we worry that the real
attraction  of  the  innocence  critique  of  the  death  penalty  (the  fear  of
executing  innocents)  might  be  attributable  less  to  a  defensible  normative
position  than  to  a  familiar  but  nonetheless  lamentable  psychological
dynamic:  the  harm  of  punishing  innocents  resonates  with  the  public
precisely  because most Americans  can empathize  with the harms that they
fear could happen to themselves, rather than those that happen only to "bad
people."  Lurking behind innocence's appeal, then, might be indifference  if
not hostility to other types of injustice.
We  discuss  the  plausible  candidates  for  the  distinctive  harm  of
executing innocents in turn.
A.  RETRIBUTIVE  GAP
The  execution of the  innocent  obviously  violates  a basic principle  of
retributivism.  Although  retribution  is  often  invoked  as  a justification  for
punishment,38 it can  also  fairly  be  invoked  as a limitation  on punishment,
requiring  that  punishment  should  correspond  to  (and  not  exceed)  a
defendant's  blameworthiness.  The  problem  of "excessive  punishment"  is
ubiquitous  in  the  contemporary  American  death  penalty  practice,  and  yet
few of these cases involve the actually innocent.
It  is  important  to  clarify  here  that  in  contemporary  discourse
surrounding  the risk  of executing  innocent  persons,  "innocent"  typically
refers  to  the  completely  blameless,  as  in  the  case  of  a  defendant
misidentified  as the perpetrator who had no involvement whatsoever  in the
offense  for which he was  convicted  and sentenced.  Indeed,  when defense
lawyers,  abolitionists,  politicians,  and  the  media  refer  to the  "innocents"
38  MICHAEL  MooRE,  LAW  AND  PSYCHIATRY  233  (1984)  ("Retributivism...  is the view
that punishment is justified by the desert of the offender ....  ).
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freed  from  death  row,  they  often  describe  them  as  "the  exonerated"-
individuals wholly absolved of blame.  Of course,  those seeking significant
reform or abolition of the death penalty on these grounds have an interest in
upping the numbers  to generate  interest in the problem, and many accounts
or  lists  of  "the  exonerated"  include  defendants  who  were  not  wholly
blameless.39  It is clear, though, that the sort of innocence  that has captured
popular  and political  attention is "pure"  innocence,  with DNA exonerations
serving  as the paradigm of "erroneous"  convictions.  The  number of death-
row inmates exonerated  in the modem era  who  fit this definition  is subject
to dispute,  but by  any  account this number appears  to be  larger than  most
casual observers of the criminal justice system  would have expected.  And
this distance between  expectation and reality seems  directly responsible  for
the renewed interest in our system of capital punishment over the past half-
decade.
But  the  problem  of "retributive  gap"  is  not  limited  to  the  wholly
blameless.  Capital  trials  are  notoriously  messy  affairs,4 0  and  there  are
numerous  categories  of death-sentenced  (and  executed)  defendants  whose
death sentences  can  fairly be characterized  as  "excessive"  punishment.  In
cases  involving  multiple  defendants,  prosecutors-and  jurors-often
misidentify  the  most  culpable  offender.  In  many  instances,  the
identification of the "triggerperson"  is actually irrelevant to death-eligibility
as  a  matter  of state  and  federal  law,  because  the  Constitution  does  not
forbid  death  sentences  based  on  accomplice  liability  so  long  as  the
defendant  was  a  significant  participant  in  a  dangerous  felony. 4
Nonetheless,  the  fact  that the  death penalty  is  authorized in  certain  cases
does not necessarily  mean it  is deserved, and prosecutors and jurors would
39 John McAdams, It's Good and We're Going to Keep It: A  Response to Ronald Tabak,
33  CoNN.  L. REv.  819,  827  (2001)  (claiming that "death  penalty  opponents  have radically
and  systematically  exaggerated  the  number"  of  death  row  inmates  who  have  been
"exonerated").
40  Justice  Marshall's  concurring  opinion  in Furman v.  Georgia insisted  that the  death
penalty  distorts  the  fair and  orderly  process of the  criminal  law.  See 408  U.S.  238,  238
(1972):
The deleterious  effects of the death penalty are also felt otherwise at trial.  For example,  its  very
existence "inevitably  sabotages  a social  or institutional program  of reformation."  In short  "the
presence  of the  death penalty as the  keystone of our penal system bedevils the  administration of
criminal justice  all  the  way  down  the  line and  is the  stumbling  block  in  the  path  of general
reform and of the treatment of crime and criminals."
Id. (citations omitted).
41 Tison  v.  Arizona,  481  U.S.  137,  158  (1987)  (death  penalty  is  constitutionally
proportionate  as  applied  to  major  participants  in dangerous  felonies  who  exhibit  reckless
indifference to human life).
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in  many cases have exercised their  discretion differently if the  "true"  facts
of the crime had been known to them.
Other defendants  have been convicted and sentenced to death contrary
to  emerging  recognition  that  such  punishment  is  excessive.  Dozens  of
defendants  with mental retardation were executed  in the decades before the
Supreme  Court declared  the practice "excessive"  and contrary  to evolving
standards of decency,42 and numerous juveniles were also executed 4 3 though
the  Court,  following  public  trends,  recently  recognized  this  practice  to be
"excessive"  as well.44
In  many  capital  trials,  inadequate  representation  causes  jurors  to
sentence  defendants to death whose mitigation, if properly investigated  and
presented, would have secured a different outcome.  In such circumstances,
the failure  to account for the defendant's reduced  moral culpability  in light
of his mitigating evidence  renders his punishment excessive.  This problem
is  commonplace,  as  capital  trial  lawyers  (and  appellate  courts  reviewing
capital  convictions)  have  only  recently  and  still  imperfectly  come  to
recognize the awesome investigative responsibility  entailed in death penalty
defense.45  In  addition,  many  capital  defendants  whose  attorneys  did
develop  significant  mitigation  at  trial  were  condemned  under  sentencing
schemes  that  precluded jurors  from  considering  and giving  effect  to  such
evidence.46  Texas,  the  modem  leader  in executions,47  did not  change  its
quasi-mandatory  statute until the  early  1990s, 48  and many of the  300 or so
inmates  executed  in  Texas  during  the  modem  era  were  condemned  by
jurors who were never  asked whether the death penalty  was deserved.  The
42  Death Penalty  Info.  Ctr. website, supra note 25,  at  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php (noting thirty-four executed offenders with evidence of mental retardation).
43  Id.  at  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php  (documenting  twenty-two
executed offenders who were juveniles at the time of their crimes).
44  Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, 2005 WL 464890 (U.S. Mar.  1, 2005).
45  See,  e.g.,  Wiggins  v.  Smith,  539  U.S.  510  (2003)  (concluding  that  trial  counsel's
failure  to  investigate  and  develop  significant  mitigating  evidence  of  abuse  constituted
deficient  performance  and  that  there  was  a  reasonability  probability  that  such  evidence
would have affected the outcome at  sentencing).
46  See,  e.g.,  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492  U.S.  302,  328  (1989)  (Penry 1) (holding  that Texas
special scheme, which asked jurors  only whether  the defendant's conduct was deliberate  and
whether  the  defendant would  be  dangerous  in  the  future,  was  constitutionally  inadequate
where  the  defendant's  mitigating  evidence  of mental  retardation  and abuse  had  relevance
outside of those inquiries).
47  Death  Penalty  Info.  Ctr. website,  supra note 25,  at  http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php  (noting  that  Texas  has  carried  out  339  out  of the  945  executions  in  the
modem  era).
48  See Steiker & Steiker, supra note  13,  at  393-96 (describing litigation surrounding  old
Texas statute  based on inability of jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence).
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Supreme Court's  recent highly-publicized  efforts49 to extend relief to Texas
defendants  sentenced under such circumstances  should  not obscure the fact
that  many more defendants  from that period were  executed and might well
not have deserved to die.
Thus,  the  problem  of  "retributive  gap"  is  not  unique  to  "pure"
innocents  but an endemic problem in the American death penalty.  And it is
striking  that comparatively  little attention  is paid  to those  defendants who,
though  guilty  of a crime  (perhaps manslaughter, or non-capital  murder,  or
capital  murder  accompanied  by  powerful  mitigation),  are  punished
excessively.
B.  FAILURE  TO PUNISH AND INCAPACITATE THE "TRUE"  OFFENDER
Apart  from  the  obvious  costs  to  the  wrongly  punished,
misidentification  of the  perpetrators  of crime  prevents  or  delays  the  truly
guilty  from  receiving  deserved  punishment  and  fails  to  incapacitate
dangerous  offenders.  Indeed,  after  Anthony  Porter's  innocence  was
established in Illinois, police came to suspect that the true culprit committed
another  murder  during  the  interval  between  Porter's  arrest  and
exoneration.5 0  The failure to identify, apprehend, and punish the guilty is of
course  a  serious  problem in  the  criminal  law generally.  "Underinclusion"
seems  to  be of special  concern  in the  death penalty  context, and,  as  noted
above,51  several of the opinions  in Furman regarded  the  failure  to punish
deserving (or at  least equally deserving) offenders with the death penalty as
constitutionally problematic.
The difficulty with this  argument  is that the erroneous punishment  of
the  actually  innocent  accounts  for  an  extremely  small  part  of  the
underinclusion problem.  Many offenders  are not apprehended or punished
simply because  their  crimes  go unsolved,  not because  an innocent  person
has  been  wrongly  charged  or  convicted.  More  significantly,  the  very
protections  our system  adopts  to prevent the conviction  and punishment  of
49  See  Penry  v.  Johnson,  532  U.S.  782  (2001)  (Penry I1) (rejecting  "nullification"
question  as  adequate  vehicle  for  mitigating evidence  unrelated  to  the  dangerousness  and
deliberateness questions  answered  by the jury);  Tennard v. Dretke,  124  S.  Ct. 2562 (2004)
(rejecting  Fifth  Circuit's  policy  of applying  Penry I  only  to  cases  involving  mitigating
evidence  amounting  to  a  uniquely  severe  condition  with  a nexus  to  the  crime);  Smith  v.
Texas,  125  S.  Ct.  400  (2004)  (summarily  reversing  Texas  Court  of Criminal  Appeals's
decision which  had purported  to distinguish  the  nullification charge  from  the one  given  in
Penry II and  which  had  found  the  defendant's  mitigating  evidence  addressable  via  the
special issues under Penry 1).
50  James  S.  Liebman, The New Death Penalty  Debate: What's DNA  Got To Do With It?,
33 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 527,  539 (2002).
51  See supra text accompanying notes  16-19.
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the innocent obviously also protect the guilty.  Our demand of proof beyond
a  reasonable  doubt guarantees  that some,  perhaps  many,  guilty  offenders
will  escape  punishment.  The  problem  of  "false  negatives"-offenders
escaping  punishment-is  less  the  result  of  "false  positives"  than  of our
efforts  to avoid "false positives."  In short,  we could hardly improve, much
less  solve,  the problem of underinclusion by  increasing  safeguards  against
erroneous  convictions.
Moreover,  to  the extent pervasive  underinclusion  has been uncovered
in  the  death  penalty  context,  it  regrettably  has  been  linked  to  racial
discrimination.  It  is  familiar  history  that  African-American  defendants
were uncommonly  likely to be punished with death from the founding until
the  modem  era,  and  much  of modem  constitutional  criminal  procedure  is
traceable  to  concerns  about  sham trials-such  as in the  Scottsboro  cases-
resulting  in African-Americans  being  sentenced  to death.  In the present
era,  though, race  appears  to  surface  less  as  an  aggravating  factor  in cases
involving minority  defendants than as a mitigating  factor in cases involving
minority victims.  Indeed,  the famous  Baldus study litigated  in McCleskey
v.  Kemp 53 strikingly  revealed that killers of blacks  (who themselves tend to
be black) were more than four times less  likely to receive  the death penalty
than killers  of whites.54  This  fact,  of course,  made McCleskey  a difficult
case,  because  it  is  not  obvious  that  this  sort  of  race-of-the-victim
discrimination  should be  addressed  by sparing killers of whites  rather than
ensuring  vindication  of  minority  victims.55   In  any  case,  the  harm  of
underinclusion  is not particular to  the problem of punishing  innocents,  and
contemporary  empirical  evidence  such  as  the  Baldus  study  suggests  that
systemic underinclusion  is attributable  to other, more troublesome,  causes.
C.  UNDERMINING  DETERRENCE
The  argument  here  is  quite  similar.  The  failure  to  punish  true
offenders  undermines  general  deterrence because the true offender escapes
punishment (and society presumably  eventually learns of that fact).  Again,
this  harm  is  certainly  real,  but  the  harm  is  not  particular  to  inaccurate
convictions,  and  inaccurate  convictions  are  not  a  particularly  significant
52  See Michael Klarman,  The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal  Procedure, 99  MICH.
L.  REv.  48  (2000) (discussing  role  of Scottsboro  cases  and  others  in  the  development  of
modem constitutional criminal procedure).
5' 481  U.S. 279 (1987).
54  Id. at  287  (noting  that under Baldus  study,  "even  after taking  account  of thirty-nine
nonracial  variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to
receive  a death sentence  as defendants charged with killing blacks").
55  See  RANDALL  KENNEDY,  RACE,  CRIME,  AND  THE  LAW  340-45  (1997)  (discussing
problems of remedy).
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source  of the  problem  of sub-optimal  deterrence.  Ironically,  inaccurate
convictions  might  actually  serve  deterrence  purposes  if their  error  goes
undetected.  Clearly  one  of the  central  dynamics  leading  to  inaccurate
convictions  is  the  pressure  law  enforcement  officials  feel  to  clear  cases.
This pressure stems in part from society's desire to communicate clearly the
"crime-does-not-pay"  message.  It  is  actually  a contested  empirical  matter
whether  the  erroneous  convictions  secured  under  such  circumstances
contribute to or detract from deterrence.  We would have to know (as we do
not)  what percentage  of inaccurate  convictions  are  discovered;  we  would
also  need  more  information  regarding  how  communities  (particularly
would-be  criminals)  receive  the  respective  "messages"  of, first,  the  quick
apprehension  of the  "perpetrator"  and,  second,  the belated  discovery  that
the  true  perpetrator  went  unpunished.  Indeed,  one  of the  challenges  to
purely utilitarian theories  of punishment is  the possibility that society could
achieve  a net benefit by punishing innocents  to deter crime if the innocence
of those punished could remain  undetected (or at least undiscovered  for an
extended time).56
D.  LOST LEGITIMACY
The  execution of innocent offenders undoubtedly  would exact a  steep
price  in  terms  of governmental  legitimacy.  It  is  a  matter  of common
understanding  that  greater  resources  are  devoted  to  capital  cases,  and  a
substantial  error  rate  in such  cases  would certainly  prompt  serious  doubts
about the accuracy  of the  criminal justice system more generally.  A crisis
of confidence  might extend beyond the criminal justice system as well.  It is
a  familiar  critique  of  the  death  penalty  that  if  we  cannot  trust  our
government  on  small  matters  and  regularly  find  fault  in  the  ordinary
operation  of governmental  bureaucracies,  we  should  not entrust  the  state
with  the  enormity  of the  death penalty.  But  in fact,  the better  argument
might  run  the  other  way:  if the  government  cannot  get  it  right  when  a
person's  life  is  at  stake,  when  everyone  appreciates  the  stakes  and
substantial  resources  are  mobilized  to  prevent  error,  how  can  we  have
confidence in the state's decision-making  in less scrutinized areas?
It  is  a  slightly  different  and  more  difficult  question  whether  the
discovery  of  erroneously  death-sentenced  individuals  undermines
governmental  legitimacy.  Supporters of the  death penalty have  pointed to
the same evidence trumpeted  by reformers  and abolitionists-the discovery
56 See MOORE, supra  note  38,  at 238 (describing case in which significant social benefits
could be achieved by punishing an  innocent person and concluding that "there  is no a priori
reason that the net social gain  in such a case might not outweigh the harm that is achieved by
punishing an innocent person").
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of  numerous  death-sentenced  innocents  during  the  appellate  and  post-
conviction  process-as  proof  of  the  system's  corrective  potential."
Developments  over  the  past  five  years  seem  to  have  generated  serious
concern  about  the  accuracy  of  the  American  death  penalty  system.  It
remains difficult, though, to assess  how the public would react today to the
execution  of an  innocent given  the absence  of an undisputed, unequivocal
case involving the execution of a blameless person in the modem era.
It  is  also  fair  to  ask whether  the  loss  of legitimacy  caused  by  the
execution  of the innocent  might be  offset  by the legitimacy  gains realized
by  the  execution  of the  guilty.  Austin  Sarat,  reflecting  on  the  continued
presence  of the  death penalty  in  a country  that regards  itself as "the  most
democratic  of democratic  nations' 58 suggests  that  the death  penalty  might
serve  an  important  role  in  confirming  the  strength  and  authority  of our
leaders.59  Democracies,  he  argues,  in which  the  locus  of power  is  in the
"people,"  need dramatic  symbols  to  confirm their  precarious  sovereignty,
and  "[i]f the sovereignty of the people is to be genuine,  it has to mimic the
sovereign power and prerogatives  of the monarchical  forms it displaced and
about  whose  sovereignty  there  could  be  few  doubts., 6 0   The  recent
experiences  in  American presidential  elections  support  this notion, as both
President George W. Bush and particularly President Bill Clinton sought to
establish  their  leadership  credentials  by  demonstrating  their  (regal)
willingness to preside over executions.6 1
In  evaluating  the  potential  harm  of  lost  legitimacy,  we  should
recognize  that  other  aspects  of  our  death  penalty  system  undermine
legitimacy  as well.  Arbitrary or discriminatory use of the death penalty can
affect public confidence even if the public harbors  no doubts about the guilt
of each  executed  defendant.  As  our  introduction  suggests,  "legitimacy"
depends  critically  on  context,  and  in  times  of declining  executions,  the
public might be more  alarmed by the inequitable  or arbitrary distribution  of
the  death  penalty  than  by  the  more  remote  risk  of executing  innocents.
Conversely, as executions rise, and less popular (and perhaps less executive
and  judicial)  attention  is  paid  to  the  circumstances  of  each  case,
57  McAdams, supra note 39,  at 834  ("[N]o proof of an innocent executed  in the  U.S.  in
the last generation...  suggests that the system works  .....
58  AUSTIN SARAT, THE KILLING STATE  5  (1999).
59  id.
60  id.
61 Richard Brooks & Steven Raphael,  Criminal Law: Life Terms of  Death Sentences: The
Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial  Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM.  L. &
CRIMINOLOGY  609, 639 (2002)  (discussing political costs of opposing capital punishment).
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"legitimacy"  might require  assurance that innocents  are not regularly  being
caught in the machinery of death.
E.  SPECIAL CRUELTY OF ENDURING UNDESERVED PUNISHMENT
The  horror  of  executing  innocents  might  ultimately  turn  on  our
revulsion  at  the prospect  of someone  being  forced  to  walk  to  his  death
knowing  his  punishment  to  be  undeserved.  This  harm  strikes  a  more
visceral chord than harms  associated with underinclusion  (knowing that one
deserves death but that some equally deserving offender has been spared) or
procedural  irregularity  (the  evidence  of one's  guilt was  obtained  through
questionable  means).  The harm is likely compounded by the stigma heaped
upon both the condemned and his family.  In children we see  a disbelieving
and  painful  anger  when  punishment  is  undeserved,  and  our  intuitions
recognize as more painful the wrongful and inescapable infliction of pain.
Here,  too,  we  acknowledge  the  horror  and  harm  but  doubt  its
distinctiveness.  As  an  initial  matter,  this  argument  about  the distinctive
cruelty  surrounding the punishment  of innocents raises profound questions.
Many  offenders,  though  in  fact guilty,  manage  to persuade  themselves  of
their own innocence.  Is their punishment less  cruel because their  "honest"
belief in victimization  is objectively  unreasonable?  In terms of magnitude,
the  group of self-assessed martyrs  is likely to  greatly outnumber the  truly
innocent.
A separate  claim relating to  cruelty at the moment of execution  based
on  psychological  factors  concerns  the  execution  of  the  incompetent.
Although the Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution forbids the
execution of persons incompetent at the time of execution,62  few protections
in  American  death penalty  law  have  been enforced  less  vigorously.  The
Supreme  Court has not crafted a general standard for assessing competency,
and many jurisdictions apply an extremely thin version of what it means to
be  "sane"  at  the  time of  execution.  As  a result,  state  and  lower  federal
courts  routinely  sustain  competency  findings  in  the  face  of  substantial
evidence  of  impaired  or  even  delusional  thought  on  the  part  of  the
defendant.  In  an  infamous  Arkansas  case  during  Bill  Clinton's  first
presidential  campaign,  the  inmate's  execution  was  allowed  to go forward
despite  the  inmate's  apparent  belief that  he  could  eat his dessert  after  the
63 execution.  And  in  a  case  involving  a  Texas  inmate,  the  federal  courts authorized  the  execution  of  an  inmate  notwithstanding  the  inmate's
62  Ford v. Wainwright,  477 U.S. 399 (1986).
63 See, e.g.,  Robert Weisberg,  The New  York Statute as Cultural  Document: Seeking the
Morally  Optimal Death Penalty, 44  BUFF.  L.  REv.  283  (1996)  (exploring  the  political
dimensions underlying the denial of clemency in Ricky Rector's case).
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delusional belief that his "dead  aunt [would] protect him from the effects of
the sedative  and toxic agents used., 64  In cases of acknowledged psychosis,
some  states  have  sought  to  forcibly  medicate  inmates  with  approaching
execution  dates  to  render  them  competent  for  execution,  and  the  federal
constitutional  status of such a practice remains open to debate.
If the paradigm,  then,  of a "non-cruel"  execution  is  one  in which  the
condemned  acknowledges  or at least understands  his  responsibility  for his
crime  and  rationally  connects  his  impending  punishment  to  his  own
culpable  actions,  executions  are  cruelly  administered  on a regular basis  in
the  United  States.  The harm  associated  with  the  execution  of innocents
cannot fairly be characterized as distinctive in this regard.65
F.  IRREVOCABILITY
Thus  far  we  have  argued  that  many  of the  harms  associated  with
punishing  the  innocent  can  be  found  in  cases  involving  those  guilty  of
wrongdoing.  A  more  tailored  claim  might  assert  the  distinctiveness  of
executing as opposed to incarcerating inmates.  On this view, we should be
especially  concerned  about  punishing  innocents  in  the  capital  context
because  death  is  irrevocable:  it is  a common  and  thoroughly  respectable
concern  about  the  death penalty  that executions  cannot  be  undone.  This
harm,  like  some  of those  discussed  above,  has  both  an  individual  and
societal  dimension:  wrongful  executions  are  terrible  for  the  innocent
condemned  because  their  lives  are  unrecoverable  and  terrible  for  society
because  such errors  are beyond repair.  But we doubt that the  death penalty
is  truly  distinctive  in  this  respect.  Innocents  who  are  convicted  and
incarcerated  can  be  freed  from  prison,  but  their  time  spent  in  prison  is
likewise  unrecoverable.  In  this respect,  the argument  of irrevocability  is
truly an argument about severity;  it is  impossible  to turn back the clock on
any  punishment  that  has  been  endured,  and  the  irretrievable  loss  in the
death penalty context exceeds the loss of wrongful imprisonment.
Moreover,  errors  are  less  likely to be  uncovered  and  corrected  in the
non-capital  context.  As  a  procedural  matter,  non-capital  inmates  have
fewer  avenues  and  resources  for  vindicating  their  claims  of  innocence.
64  Garrett v. Collins, 951  F.2d 57,  58 (5th Cir. 1992).
65 Some  might  argue  that  wrongful  execution  (as  opposed  to  incarceration)  of  the
innocent  is especially  cruel, but we  have  our doubts.  Undeserved punishment  carries  this
cost in both capital and  non-capital cases.  Wrongful  incarceration is endured  one  day at a
time, and  the  structural  deafness  of our  criminal  justice  system  to  non-capital  claims  of
actual innocence undoubtedly compounds the frustration of involuntary restraint.  Again,  the
collective magnitude of the error in the non-capital context dwarfs the corresponding  harm in
our administration of the death penalty.
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States  generally  provide  post-conviction  counsel  as  a  matter  of right  to
indigent death-sentenced  inmates,  but not to others,  and Congress  likewise
funds indigent representation in federal habeas  only in capital cases.  Media
attention is also likely to be directed toward capital cases, in part because of
society's fascination  with death  and in  part because  of the presence  of an
advocate  for the  inmate.  The  recent  burgeoning  of "innocence  projects"
will help vindicate some claims of non-capital  inmates, particularly in cases
involving DNA, but the resources presently available to non-capital  inmates
are  plainly  insufficient  to  assure  meaningful  investigation  in  the  vast
majority  of  cases.  Given  a  national  prison  population  hovering  over
2,000,000,  even  an optimistic  error rate of one percent  would translate  into
more than 20,000 wrongfully  incarcerated inmates.  The irreparable loss for
those  individuals  represents  an  undoubtedly  significant  harm,  and  in
practical  terms amounts  to many more ruined lives than could be  attributed
to  the  American  death  penalty  over  its  whole  history  much  less  in  the
modem era.
We  thus  conclude  that  the  conviction  and  execution  of the  innocent
entails harms that are ubiquitously present in the capital punishment system.
Perhaps more  significantly, other sorts of injustices, including  the arbitrary
or discriminatory  administration  of the death penalty  and the  execution  of
guilty but undeserving or impaired offenders, actually present these risks in
greater magnitudes.
What,  then,  accounts  for  the  apparent  appeal  of  the  innocence
argument  and the comparative  devaluation  of other errors  and injustices in
our criminal justice  system?  We fear that the power of innocence  claims
derives  in  large  part  from  a  type  of cognitive  bias.  Individuals  tend  to
overestimate  risks  of harm  that  they  believe  themselves  to  face  and  to
underestimate  risks they  view as  attaching only  to others.  Even with  our
extraordinary  incarceration  rates,  most Americans  do not view themselves
as  potential  criminals,  and  thus  most  Americans  are  unlikely  to  view
themselves  as subject to the many risks of harm we detailed above.  On the
other hand,  we  suspect  that  many  Americans,  whether  offender  or non-
offender, can imagine  getting erroneously  caught in the web of the criminal
justice  system, even  if, as a practical  matter, the  overall  risk is  small  and
overwhelmingly  distributed  to actual  offenders  (the  usual  suspects).  This
process  of  identification  is  fueled  by  dramatic  media  accounts  of  the
wrongfully  accused  and  convicted  and  the  comparative  lack  of public
interest in the harms inflicted upon the guilty.  Hence,  though we obviously
acknowledge  the devastating costs of punishing and executing the innocent,
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we  are  not  persuaded,  as  a  normative  matter,  that  such  costs  necessarily
deserve priority in critiquing the American capital justice system.
III.  INNOCENCE AS  STRATEGY
Those  who work  as litigators to  free  the  innocent from  death row, or
those  who  work  as  reformers  to  prevent  or  reduce  the  incidence  of such
miscarriages  of justice, are  by no means necessarily  insensitive  to the  less
dramatic,  but  more  endemic,  injustices  in  the  administration  of capital
punishment that we have  described above.  Rather,  it is commonly, indeed
virtually  universally,  believed  that emphasis  on the  possible  execution  of
the  innocent  is  the  best  strategy  to broadly  reform  or  even  to  abolish the
death  penalty.  Hence,  death  penalty  reformers  and  abolitionists  might
respond to  our arguments  questioning the distinctiveness  of innocence  as a
normative  matter  by asserting  the  power  of innocence  as  a  reforming  or
abolitionist  strategy.  Who  cares,  they  might  say  or  think,  whether
innocence  is special  in some abstract  sense, when it is so clearly  special in
the concrete political  sense as  a lever by which to move public opinion and
public policy?
The  argument  for  the  strategic  distinctiveness  of  innocence  is  as
powerful,  perhaps  even  more  so,  than  the  argument  for  its  normative
distinctiveness.  Some of those closest  to the action  have begun  to use the
term  "innocence  revolution"  to  describe  the  past  five  years  of renewed
skepticism, debate,  and public policy  initiatives  at all levels of government
regarding the administration of the death penalty.66  Rob Warden's paper in
this symposium  is a riveting account of the most dramatic chapter thus  far
in the  story  of the  "innocence  revolution"-the  experience  of the state  of
Illinois, in which a spate of high-profile  exonerations of death row inmates
galvanized  a Republican  governor to declare  a moratorium  on  executions
and  then  to  offer  mass  clemency  to  the  entire  death  row  population.67
Warden  also  describes  the  somewhat  less  dramatic  movement  of  the
reluctant  Illinois  legislature  toward  a  reform  "package"  that  attempts  to
respond  to  some  of the  most egregious  problems  in  the administration  of
capital  punishment  that  were  brought  to  light  by  the  post-exoneration
investigations  into the failure of the Illinois criminal justice  system.68  The
66  Mark  A.  Godsey  &  Thomas  Pulley,  The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving
Standards of  Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence,  29  U. DAYTON L. REv.  265 (2004);
Lawrence C. Marshall,  The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 573 (2004).
67  Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How it Happened, What it Promises, 95
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMI'NOLOGY  381 (2005).
68  Id.  at 387-88.
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Illinois experience,  while  unusually  dramatic, illustrates well the attraction
of focusing on innocence as  a strategy for both  abolitionists and reformers.
From  the  abolitionist  perspective,  Governor  Ryan's  complete  conversion
from supporter of capital  punishment to abolitionist holds out the hope  that
mounting  concerns  about  executing  the  innocent  may  shake  the  solid
foundation of public  support for  capital punishment  that has  existed  since
the  1970s.69   From  the  reformist  perspective,  the  work  of  the  Illinois
legislature  suggests  that  concerns  about innocence  can  lead to widespread
systemic  reform-not  only  greater  DNA  collection  and  testing,  but  also
reforms  designed  to  improve  police  investigative  procedures,  to  prevent
prosecutorial  misconduct,  and  to  provide  better  funding  and  higher
standards  for  capital  defense,  among  other  things.  The  power  of  the
"innocence  movement"  to promote  reform  derives  in  large  part  from  the
fact that DNA exonerations  offer what Richard Rosen has called a "random
audit"  of convictions,  thus  providing  a  window  into  the  mistakes  of the
criminal justice system and generating  a list of particular failures  that need
to be corrected.70  Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, the leaders of the DNA
exoneration  movement  and  co-founders  of The  Innocence  Project  at  the
Cardozo  School  of Law,  have  repeatedly  urged  that  the  false  convictions
they have uncovered  require not only more "innocence  projects"  and DNA
reforms, but also broader systemic reforms of the criminal justice system.7'
Thus,  it  is  not  surprising  that  abolitionists  and  reformers  alike,
appalled  and  galvanized  by  the  discovery  of innocent  convicts  on  death
row, have treated the problem of innocence as  something of a strategic gift.
History may prove  them right;  it may  turn out that current concerns  about
executing the innocent will provide a crucial push toward ultimate abolition
of  the  death  penalty  in  the  United  States,  or  that  important  reforms  in
capital  punishment  or  criminal  justice  generally  will  be  instituted  in
response  to  those  concerns.  There  are  reasons,  however,  to  look  the
proverbial  gift horse in the mouth.  One of the privileges  and duties of the
legal academy is to question conventional  orthodoxies, and we seek here  to
question  and  perhaps  to  qualify  the  current  consensus  that  focus  on  the
problem  of innocence  is  the best strategy  for  promoting  change regarding
the  administration  of capital  punishment.  What  follows  are  three  sets  of
69  Gallup  polling  data,  asking  the  same  abstract  question,  "Do  you  favor  the  death
penalty  for those convicted  of murder?,"  has  reported  substantial majorities  in favor  of the
death penalty from  the early  1970s on,  though the numbers  have dropped  from high of 80%
in favor in 1994 to a recent low of 66% in the October, 2004 poll.  See Press Release,  Joseph
Carroll, Assistant Editor, The Gallup Organization, Who  Supports the  Death Penalty?  (Nov.
16, 2004), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid = 23&did=1266.
70  Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and  Death, 82 N.C. L. REv.  61,  69 (2003).
71 See generally  DWYER  ET AL.,  supra note 33.
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concerns about the current unquestioning focus on innocence.  Even if these
concerns are not sufficient to offset the benefits of focusing on innocence-
and, frankly, we are not certain that they are-they at least illuminate  some
possible pitfalls that may lie along this strategic path.
A.  THE OTHER INNOCENCE REVOLUTION:  TRUTH-SEEKING  AS A
LIMIT ON LITIGATION  OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
It  should  be  with  some  sense  of  irony  that  advocates  hail  the
"innocence  revolution" in the debate about capital punishment, because not
very  long  ago  there  was  an  "innocence  revolution"  of a  different  sort  in
criminal  procedure  that  has  had  a  huge  impact  on  the  litigation  of
constitutional  claims  by  capital  defendants.  In  response  to  the  Warren
Court's  incorporation  of the  criminal  procedure  provisions  of the Bill  of
Rights,  its  expansive reading  of those  provisions,  and its  liberal  approach
toward  the  availability  of federal  review  of  state  court  convictions,  the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts moved in the  1970s and 1980s to craft rules of
constitutional  adjudication in the criminal process to focus on truth-seeking
rather  than  vindication  of constitutional  rights per se.  This  reorientation
had  a  substantial  impact  on  the  constitutional  standards  regarding
ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  and  prosecutorial  duties  to  disclose
exculpatory  evidence-the  two  constitutional  issues  most  important  to
capital  defendants.  At the same time, the Court substantially narrowed the
availability of federal  habeas  corpus review,  crafting  exceptions  for claims
of  "actual  innocence."  Congress  then  adopted  and  strengthened  these
limitations  on  habeas  review,  codifying  some  of  the  "innocence"
exceptions,  while  at  the  same  time  narrowing  them.  Many  of those  who
now  hail  the  new  "innocence  revolution"  and  its  potential  to  reform  or
abolish  capital  punishment  railed  against  these  earlier  judicial  and
legislative  innovations.  We fear that unreflective  embrace  of "innocence"
as  strategy  by  reformers  and  abolitionists  may  undermine  the  efforts  and
credibility  of the criminal and capital defense bar in its attempt to formulate
and litigate alternatives to this earlier "innocence revolution."
Consider  first  the  striking  reorientation  of  federal  habeas  review
around  the  issue  of  actual  innocence.  Judge  Henry  Friendly's  hugely
influential  1970  speech  and  article, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 72 repudiated
the Warren Court's expansive  treatment of collateral federal  review of state
court  convictions  as  a  vehicle  for  the  consideration  of  all  federal
constitutional  claims  in  a federal  forum.  Rather,  argued Friendly,  federal
72 Henry  J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral  Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38  U. CHI. L. REV.  142,  142 (1970).
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habeas  review  of  constitutional  issues  should  be  restricted,  with  rare
exception, to  the much  smaller  subset of such  issues that  are accompanied
by  a  colorable  claim  of actual  innocence.  Friendly's  exhortation  fell  on
receptive  ears  on  the  Court,  and  the  resulting  judicial  reorientation  of
federal  habeas  law  is well-known-and  frequently  lamented  by  critics  of
capital  punishment.  While  the  Court  did  not  directly  embrace  potential
innocence  as  a precondition  for federal  habeas  relief, it instead  repeatedly
tightened  procedural  requirements  for  federal  habeas  petitions,73 allowing
only few and narrow exceptions for the many petitioners who failed to meet
them-with  innocence  paramount  among the  exceptions.74  Moreover,  the
Court  also limited  the  substantive  scope  of federal  habeas  review  in  two
different  ways,  both  of which  reflected  its  emphasis  on  innocence  as  a
limiting  criterion.  First,  the  Court's  preclusion  of  Fourth  Amendment
claims  from re-litigation  in a federal  forum was based on Justice  Powell's
recognition,  citing  Friendly,  that  such  claims  always  impede  rather  than
promote the accuracy of criminal verdicts.75  Second, the Court's preclusion
of  "new"  constitutional  claims  on  federal  habeas,  like  its  tightened
procedural  rules,  allowed  only  narrow  exceptions,  the  most  significant  of
which  concerned  issues  related  to  verdict  accuracy.76  Finally,  for  the
increasingly  few  habeas  claims  that  both  meet  the  Court's  heightened
procedural  requirements  and  fall within  its narrowed  scope of review,  the
Court has  relaxed  the  standard  for deeming  constitutional  errors  harmless
on  habeas  review,  once  again  on  grounds  that  only  truly  grievous
constitutional  wrongs-conviction  of the  innocent  being  the  paramount
case-should be corrected on habeas.77
73  See  Wainwright  v.  Sykes,  433  U.S.  72  (1977)  (excuse  for  petitioner's  failure  to
comply  with  state  procedural  rule  must  meet  "cause  and  prejudice"  standard  rather  than
"deliberate  bypass"  standard  of Fay  v.  Noia,  372  U.S.  391  (1963));  Keeney  v.  Tamayo-
Reyes,  504 U.S.  1 (1992)  (applying "cause and prejudice"  standard to  failure to develop  the
facts underlying  claim) (overruling  Townsend v. Sain, 372  U.S.  293 (1963));  McCleskey v.
Zant,  499  U.S.  467  (1991)  (applying  "cause  and  prejudice"  standard  to  new  claims  not
presented  in previous petition);  Kuhlmann  v. Wilson,  477 U.S.  436 (1986)  (applying "cause
and prejudice"  standard to successive  claims raising grounds identical  to grounds  heard and
decided on the merits in a previous petition).
74  The  Court  crafted  a  narrow  "miscarriage  of justice"  exception  to  the  "cause  and
prejudice"  requirement,  allowing  petitioners  to  raise  successive  claims,  repetitive  new
claims,  or defaulted  claims  if they  made  a  colorable  showing  of actual  innocence  of the
underlying  crime.  See McCleskey  v. Zant,  499  U.S.  467  (1991)  (repetitive  new  claims);
Murray v. Carrier, 477  U.S. 478  (1986)  (defaulted  claims);  Kuhlmann  v. Wilson,  477  U.S.
436 (1986)  (successive  claims);  see also Sawyer v. Whitley,  505 U.S.  333  (1992)  (crafting
an even narrower "innocent of the death penalty"  miscarriage-of-justice exception).
75  See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
76  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.  288 (1989).
77  See Brecht  v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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This  judicial  "innocence  revolution"  had  already  been  fully
accomplished  when  Congress joined  the fray, amending  the federal habeas
statute  in  the  Antiterrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996
(AEDPA).78  Congress, like the  Court, did not make  innocence a threshold
requirement for habeas review.  Moreover, Congress made many restrictive
changes  to  habeas  law  either  unrelated  to or  at  odds  with  innocence  as a
central  foCUS.
79  Nonetheless,  in  several  key ways,  the  1996  amendments
borrowed from and exaggerated  the Court's use of innocence  as a gateway
to habeas relief.  In banning consideration  of new claims raised in  a second
or  successive  habeas  petition,  Congress,  like  the  Court,  crafted  an
"innocence"  exception8  -but  limited it  to  claims of factual  innocence  of
the underlying offense (rather than ineligibility for the death penalty, as the
Court  permitted), 81  and  required  that  the  petitioner  prove  such  factual
innocence  by  "clear  and  convincing  evidence '82 (rather  than  the  Court's
less  demanding  "more  likely  than  not' 83  standard).84   Similarly,  in
restricting  the  availability  of  evidentiary  hearings  on  habeas  review,
Congress crafted an "innocence"  exception  that resembled the one adopted
by  the  Court,85  but  with  the  same  exaggerations  found  in  its  successive
petition provisions.86
78  Pub. L. No.  104-132,  110  Stat. 1214 (1996)  (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
79  For example, AEDPA's "opt-in"  provisions,  providing a shorter statute of limitations
in capital cases for  states who  meet certain standards  for provision of capital representation
services,  have no  direct relationship  to innocence;  arguably,  AEDPA's creation of a statute
of limitations with no explicit innocence exception is at odds with concerns about innocence
preservation.
80  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)  (2000).
81 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.  333 (1992).
82  28 U.S.C.  § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
83  See Murray  v. Carrier, 477  U.S.  478,  496 (1986).  The  Court imposed  a  "clear  and
convincing"  standard  of proof only on defendants  seeking to show that they were ineligible
for the death penalty, rather than  innocent of the underlying  offense.  See Sawyer, 505 U.S.
at 336.
84  Moreover,  the  statute  provides  that  the  innocence  showing  is  a  necessary  but  not
sufficient  condition  for  the consideration of a new claim  in a second  or successive  habeas
petition; the petitioner must additionally  show that "the  factual predicate for the claim could
not have been discovered previously through the exercise of  due diligence  .... "  28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(B)(i).  In  contrast,  the Court  had ruled  that a  colorable  innocence  claim  was a
sufficient condition for an exception to its limitations on successive petitions-an  alternative
to a  showing of "cause"  for failure to  have raised the  issue  in previous  submissions,  rather
than an additional requirement.  See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
85  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
86  The statute requires proof of innocence  of the underlying offense rather than innocence
of the death penalty, proof by the higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence,
2005]CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M  STEIKER
This judicial  and legislative re-calibration  of the  availability of federal
habeas corpus  relief was part  of a  larger  movement  to  make  the  accurate
determination  of guilt  or innocence  the  paramount  or exclusive  value  in
constitutional  criminal  procedure.  If  Judge  Friendly's  Is  Innocence
Irrelevant? spurred  and  reflected  a  new  outlook  on  habeas  corpus,  Judge
Marvin  Frankel's  speech  and  article,  The Search for Truth: An  Umpireal
View,  published  five  years  later,  reflected the changing  zeitgeist regarding
the criminal  process.87  The Burger and Rehnquist  Courts moved  on many
fronts to repudiate or limit the Warren  Court's view of the criminal process
as an  appropriate  venue  for addressing  claims  of police  and  prosecutorial
misconduct  or for promoting  abstract  values  (such  as  dignity,  fairness,  or
equality),  when  vindication  of such  claims  or  values  would  come  at the
expense  of  accuracy  in  criminal  trial  verdicts.  Many  doctrines,  too
numerous  to  canvas,  reflect  this  shift  in constitutional  criminal  procedure
toward limiting  the vindication  of constitutional  values  other than,  and  in
tension with,  verdict  accuracy.  Perhaps the  most obvious  example  is the
Fourth  Amendment  context,  where  the Court  repeatedly  cut  back  on the
remedy  of evidentiary  exclusion,  trading  off again and  again  the value  of
incremental  (in  the  Court's  view)  deterrence  of police  misconduct  for
88 greater accuracy of criminal dispositions.
For  death  penalty  reformers  and  abolitionists,  however,  two  related
doctrines  generated  during  this  truth-seeking  revolution  ought  to  be  of
particular  concern:  the  constitutional  doctrines  regarding  the  right  to
effective assistance  of counsel (Strickland  v.  Washington89 and  its progeny)
and the duty of prosecutors to disclose potentially  exculpatory  information
and a proof of innocence  in addition to, rather than as an alternative  to, a showing of cause
for failure to develop the factual record in state court.
87  Marvin  Frankel,  The Search for Truth: An  Umpireal View,  123  U. PA.  L.  REV.  1031
(1975).  While  Frankel  was  more  concerned  with  the  roles  of lawyers  and judges  in  the
adversary  process  than  with  the  field of constitutional  criminal procedure,  his  admonition
that the  trial process  had moved too  far from  the  central  mission of truth-seeking  struck a
chord;  his article, originally given as a lecture  to the New York Bar Association the previous
year, was  immediately  cited by  Justice  Powell  in Stone  v. Powell, 428 U.S.  465,  488  n.25
(1976).
88  See, e.g.,  United  States v. Leon, 468  U.S.  897  (1984)  (fashioning  an exception  to the
exclusionary rule for good faith reliance on the issuance of an invalid warrant);  United  States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620  (1980)  (permitting the use of unconstitutionally  seized evidence  to
impeach a testifying defendant at trial); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.  128 (1978)  (reformulating
the doctrine of Fourth Amendment  standing to seek exclusion of evidence); Stone v.  Powell,
428  U.S.  465  (1976)  (limiting  the  invocation  of the  exclusionary  rule  on  federal  habeas
corpus  review);  United  States  v.  Calandra,  414  U.S.  338  (1974)  (permitting  the  use  of
unconstitutionally seized evidence in the grand jury).
89  466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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(Brady v. Maryland 9° and its progeny).  The current "innocence  revolution"
has  taught  us that  failures  of trial  counsel  and  suppression  by the  state  of
exculpatory  evidence  are two of the primary  causes  of the  conviction and
sentencing  to  death  of  innocent  people.91  Yet  the  ex  post  "reasonable
probability"  of acquittal  standard  promulgated  during  the other  "innocence
revolution"-as  both the  "prejudice"  prong of the Strickland analysis  and
the  stringent  definition  of "materiality"  in  the  Brady line  of cases-has
proven  to be  one of the biggest  stumbling  blocks for capital defendants  in
their attempts to present such claims for relief.
The  Warren  Court,  despite  its  many  rulings  on  criminal  procedure,
never  offered  a  general  constitutional  framework  for the  consideration  of
claims  by  criminal  defendants  that  their  counsel  provided  ineffective
representation.  Finally, in the waning years  of the Burger Court, the Court
accepted the constitutional  project and decided Strickland, a capital  case  in
which the defendant argued that his lawyer failed to investigate and present
potentially mitigating  evidence  prior to and during his sentencing hearing.
The Court, concerned  that  its new,  generalized  standard  for attorney  error
might open  the floodgates  of litigation and reversal,  held that convictions
(and  capital  sentences)  should  remain  undisturbed  even when  defendants
could  demonstrate  that their  counsel's performance  fell  below the  Court's
deferential bar of reasonable  competence, unless such defendants could also
show  "prejudice"  from  specific  attorney  errors.  The  Court  defined
"prejudice"  (citing  the  developing  Brady  line  of  cases)  as  "a  reasonable
probability  that,  but  for  counsel's  unprofessional  errors,  the  result  of the
proceeding  would  have  been  different,"  noting  that  "[a]  reasonable
probability  is  a  probability  sufficient  to  undermine  confidence  in  the
outcome. 92  This  test  was  not  a  new  one  for the  Court;  it  reflected  the
extent to  which  the  accuracy of outcomes had become  both the beginning
and  the  end  of constitutional  analysis.  It  is  telling  that  Justice  Marshall
wrote  for  himself  alone-without  even  his  usual  companion  Justice
Brennan-in  questioning  the  ascendancy  of  verdict  accuracy  in  the
formulation of the Strickland  prejudice standard:
[T]he  assumption  on  which the  Court's holding  rests  is that the only  purpose of the
constitutional  guarantee  of effective assistance  of counsel  is to reduce the chance that
innocent  persons  will  be  convicted.  In  my  view,  the  guarantee  also  functions  to
ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally  fair procedures.  The
majority contends  that the  Sixth Amendment  is not violated when  a manifestly  guilty
90  373 U.S.  83 (1963).
91 See Warden, supra note 67, at 403 n.94 (citing Armstrong series in Chicago Tribune).
92  Strickland, 466  U.S.  at  694  (citing,  inter alia, United States  v. Agurs,  427  U.S.  97
(1976)).
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defendant  is  convicted  after a  trial  in  which  he  was  represented  by  a  manifestly
ineffective attorney.  I cannot agree.
93
Marshall  urged instead that the government  should  bear the burden of
proving  that  incompetent  lawyers  were  "harmless  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt,"  the general  standard  for other forms  of constitutional  error during
criminal trials.94
Marshall  was  also  the  dissenting  voice  (this time  with  Brennan),  on
similar  grounds,  when  the  Court  used  the  same  "reasonable  probability"
standard to define the  scope of prosecutorial  duties  to disclose  exculpatory
evidence95 under Brady, the case in which the Warren Court first announced
a  general  prosecutorial  duty  to  disclose  under  the  Due  Process  clause.
Brady,  like  Strickland, was  a  death  penalty  case.96  The  Court  reversed
Brady's death sentence  because the prosecutor had failed to disclose  to the
defense  a statement by  Brady's companion  during the offense admitting to
the  actual  killing  (while still  implicating  Brady  as an  accomplice).97  The
Court's  opinion,  holding  that  "material"  exculpatory  evidence  must  be
turned  over  to  the  defense  by  the  state,  did  not  offer  a  definition  of
"materiality"  other  than  such evidence  as  "would  tend  to"  exculpate  the
defendant or reduce the penalty.98  In later cases, however, the Burger Court
sharply circumscribed the definition of "materiality,"  ultimately referencing
Strickland  and  concluding  that  undisclosed  exculpatory  evidence  is
"material"  only "if there is a reasonable probability  that, had the  evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."99
Once again, Marshall  took the Court to task for creating too high a bar
for relief.  He  castigated  the  Court  for  being too  "anxious  to  assure  that
reversals  are  handed  out  sparingly"'00  and  urged  that  values  other  than
accuracy  ought  to  trump  the  preservation  of  guilty  verdicts.  Marshall
appealed  to  the need  to  shape  a more  disinterested role  for prosecutors  in
the adversary  system  and  thus to  avoid creating  incentives for prosecutors
to "play the  odds."' 0 '  He argued that the general  structure of the adversary
93  Id. at  711 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
94 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.  18 (1967).
95  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.  667, 685 (1985). 96 Brady, 373 U.S. 83.
97  id.
9'  Id.  at 88.
99  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
1oo  Id. at 702 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
'o' Id. at 701 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
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system  and  "equality  of justice"'0 2  depended  on  the  government  sharing
exculpatory  information  with  defendants,  regardless  of  the  outcomes  of
particular  cases.  And he  squarely urged  that sometimes  the  "apparent"'
0 3
fairness  of trials  ought  to  matter,  even  when  there  is  no  showing  that  a
defendant  is  either  innocent  or  actually  harmed  by  the  government's
misconduct.  In  urging  automatic  reversal  for  deliberate  prosecutorial
failures  to  disclose  exculpatory  evidence,  Marshall  argued  that  such
misconduct is "antithetical  to our most basic vision of the role of the state in
the criminal process.'
1 0 4
This  sketch  of  how  the  now-familiar  landscape  of  constitutional
criminal  procedure  and  habeas  corpus  review  developed  is  not  meant  to
suggest that anyone concerned about the execution of innocent people today
necessarily  endorses  all  or  any  of  these  particular  doctrines.  Rather,
consideration  of this  earlier  "innocence  revolution"  offers  some  cautions
that might  temper,  at  least  a  little,  the wholesale  commitment  of current
death penalty reformers  and abolitionists to an innocence  strategy.  First,  a
lesson  for  reformers.  Many  hope  that the  "random  audit"'0 5  function  of
DNA analysis  will lead to  a greater understanding  of systemic problems  in
the criminal justice system that need reform and a greater willingness to fix
them;  their hopes  are buoyed  by the  interest  that policy  makers,  including
the  Illinois  legislature,  recently  have  shown  in  addressing  issues  like
identification procedures  and standards  for capital defense counsel.  But the
debate  over the reform of federal habeas corpus teaches that concerns  about
innocence can just as plausibly  be used  to  promote the  creation  of special
procedures  only for those who can assert  the possibility  (or probability)  of
factual  innocence  rather  than  the  maintenance  of far  more  costly general
protections for all defendants.  If technological advances hold out hope that
such "special procedures" exist or might soon be developed in capital cases,
enthusiasm for general procedural reform may well dissipate.l16
Second,  and more  globally,  we  are worried  that  the  current  focus  on
innocence  may  implicitly  concede  the  lesser  power  of  other  systemic
critiques.  Larry  Marshall,  a  towering  figure  in  the  current  "innocence
revolution,"  celebrates  the  fact  that  innocence  is  so  uncontested  a  value,
especially  in comparison  to  the Warren  Court's "controversial  set  of value
102 Id. at 695 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
103 Id. at 693 (Marshall, J.,  dissenting).
104  Id. at 704 n.6 (Marshall,  J.,  dissenting).  As in the Strickland  context, Marshall urged
the  Chapman constitutional  harmless  error  standard for non-deliberate  failures  to disclose
potentially exculpatory material.  Id.  at 696.
105  Rosen, supra  note  70, at 69.
106  See infra Part IJI.C.
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judgments  pursuant  to  constitutional  values  of  autonomy,  integrity,  and
respect for the individual.' ' 7  While  it is impossible not to see his point and
share  the  relief  of  having  an  argument  whose  central  premise  is
unquestioned,  we  hope  that  the  Warren  Court's premise  that  some values
trump accuracy  survives (even if we don't embrace the particulars  of all  of
its doctrinal  innovations).  Contrary to many eloquent critics of the Warren
Court's  criminal  procedure  revolution,'0 8  we  are  not  convinced  that  re-
orienting  constitutional  criminal procedure around accuracy is so obviously
right.  We think that there are good reasons to empower criminal  defendants
with  the  ability  to  challenge  police  and  prosecutorial  misconduct,  racial
discrimination  and  disparity,  and  structural  inequities  in  the  criminal
process,  even  when  such  challenges  might  undermine  the  validity  of
otherwise accurate criminal convictions.  While focusing on innocence as  a
strategy  does  not  preclude  championing  such  challenges,  it  can  make  it
harder  to  confidently  or  persuasively  argue--or  even  think-them.
Moreover,  the  source  of such  challenges  is  limited  to  the  capital  and
criminal  defense  bars  and  the  legal  academy.  If they channel  the  bulk of
their  time,  energy,  and  material  resources  toward  innocence  claims  and
strategies, other systemic critiques may be weakened or lost.'
0 9
One  could  fairly  respond  that  the  Warren  Court  decisively  lost  its
battles;  why  urge  the  defense  bar  and  the  academy  to  waste  their  time
fighting  the  last  war?  Wouldn't  a  more  fruitful  strategy  be  to  hoist  the
Court  by  its  own  petard  and  urge  doctrinal  and  public  policy  reforms
centered  around  the  new  paradigm  of innocence?  This,  too,  is  a  fair
point, 10  but such a strategy might fail to recognize  that there are vestiges of
a counter-paradigm  that still remain,  which  could become  more vulnerable
if the  new  paradigm  were  to  gain  complete  ascendance.  Consider  one
important  example:  claims  for  reversal  of  convictions  in  cases  of  race
107  Marshall, supra note 66, at 573.
108  See  generally AKHIL  REED  AMAR,  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  CRIMINAL  PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES  (1997).
109  We  thus  turn on  its head  Bill Stuntz's  fear that  the  Warren  Court's  recognition  of
greater  procedural  rights  shifted  limited  defense  resources  away  from  investigating  and
pursuing  claims  of factual  innocence.  See  William  J.  Stuntz,  The  Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal  Justice, 107  YALE L.J.  1, 4 (1997).  We  worry
that focusing too exclusively  on individual  claims of innocence may  drain energy away from
larger systemic critiques.
110  This is exactly the sort of argument that one of us made regarding the cognizability of
"bare  innocence"  claims  on  federal  habeas  review.  See  generally  Jordan  M.  Steiker,
Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41  UCLA  L.  REv.  303  (1993)  (arguing  that  the  Court's
willingness  to  craft  federal  habeas  as  an  equitable  remedy  without  strict  adherence  to
statutory  language  supports  an  argument  for  the  cognizability  of innocence  as  a  claim
independent from constitutional error).
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discrimination  in the  selection of jurors  and grand jurors  have escaped  the
Court's  usual  demands  for  proof  of  some  demonstrable  effect  on  the
verdict.  Rather, in the peremptory  challenge context, the Court emphasized
the  need  to  allow  criminal  defendants  to  seek  remedies  for discrimination
against  racial  minorities  excluded  from  their  juries  because  of  the
importance  of protecting "public confidence  in the fairness of our system of
justice.""'  Even  more  extraordinarily,  the Court has repeatedly  refused to
apply  its  usual  harmless  error  principles  to  racial  discrimination  in  the
selection  of  the  grand  jury,"12  even  when  a  properly  selected  trial  jury
convicted the  defendant beyond  a reasonable doubt of murder, maintaining
that such discrimination  "'strikes at the  fundamental  values of our judicial
system  and  our  society  as  a  whole.""'1 3 This  latter  holding  generated  a
vehement dissent by Justice  Powell, one of the strongest  proponents  of the
innocence  paradigm  in  federal  habeas  and  constitutional  criminal
procedure, contending:  "The Court does not adequately explain why  grand
jury discrimination  affects  the 'integrity  of the judicial process'  to a greater
extent than the deprivation  of equally vital constitutional  rights, nor why it
is exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitutional errors are
not."' 14  Powell  puts  his  finger  on  the  discordance  between  the  Court's
emerging  innocence  paradigm  and  some  vestiges  of the  Warren  Court's
counter-paradigm  emphasizing racial justice.  These scraps of an alternative
vision  need  to  be  defended  and nurtured  in advocacy-before  courts,  and
before  public  policy-makers  and  the  court of public opinion-lest they be
discarded as the ill-fitting remnants of a clearly outmoded way of thinking.
The  extent  to  which  such  an  alternative  vision  has  become
subordinated  to  the  new  innocence  paradigm  is  reflected  in the  title (and
substance)  of  an  article  by  Steve  Bright,  one  of the  country's  premier
capital  defense  lawyers  and  abolitionist  advocates.  Bright's  Is Fairness
Irrelevant?"  5 is a play  on the  title  of Judge  Friendly's  famous  Innocence
essay  and  reflects  just  how  powerful  Friendly's  vision  has  become.
Bright's  call  for  a  jurisprudence  focused  on  fundamental  fairness  in
procedures  for racial minorities, the mentally handicapped,  and the indigent,
be  they  guilty  or  not,  is exactly  the  kind of "push-back"  that  we need  to
counter the increasing  dominance  of the new  innocence paradigm,  but it  is
111  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,  88 (1986).
112 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 (1986) (citing previous cases).
113  Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.  545, 556 (1979)).
114  Id. at 271 (Powell,  J., dissenting).
115  Stephen  B.  Bright,  Is  Fairness Irrelevant?: The  Evisceration of Federal Habeas
Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of  State Courts to Protect  Fundamental  Rights, 54
WASH.&  LEE L. REv.  1 (1997).
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also  the kind of analysis  that can be  subordinated  to or even  weakened by
the  siren  call  of appeals  to  the  problem  of innocence.  Bright,  like  other
abolitionist  advocates,  has  naturally  begun  to  highlight  the  issue  of
innocence, 1 6 but there is some uneasy tension between such arguments and
more  traditional  arguments  about  fair  procedures  and  the  possibility  of
redemption.  We  worry  that too  much  enthusiasm  for  and  emphasis  on
innocence  may play  a supporting role in  rendering other values apparently
"irrelevant."
B.  INNOCENCE  PROJECTS AND THE UNDERMINING  OF TRADITIONAL
PUBLIC DEFENSE VALUES
The preceding  section outlines  our fear that  too vigorous  an  embrace
of the "innocence revolution" might skew both the analysis and advocacy of
the  defense  bar  and  the  academy,  two  key  sources  of  critique  of  the
administration of capital punishment.  An additional fear, elaborated  in this
section,  is  that  the  institutional  mechanism  by  which  the  "innocence
revolution"  has  proceeded  might  have  an  unintentional  but  unavoidable
negative  impact  on the fragile capital  and criminal  defense bars.  At  first,
the "innocence  revolution"  proceeded  in  an ad hoc  fashion,  as revolutions
are  wont  to  do.  The  famous  and  oft-told  story  of  Anthony  Porter's
exoneration  by journalism students  is an example of the fortuity of some of
the early cases.' 7  In recent years, however, there has been  an explosion of
"innocence  projects"  modeled  on  the  path-breaking  Innocence  Project  of
Cardozo  School  of  Law  founded  in  1992  by  Barry  Scheck  and  Peter
Neufeld,  both  former  public  defenders  themselves.  The  Cardozo  project
has  been  hugely  successful  in  using  DNA  testing  to  expose  erroneous
findings  of  guilt,  responsible  for  well  over  100  DNA  exonerations  of
convicted  inmates  to  date." 18  There  are  now  forty-two  other  "innocence
projects"  in the United States, 19 some of which follow  the Cardozo model
of pursuing only  DNA exonerations,  but  most of which  pursue  innocence
claims by traditional  evidentiary  means, as well. 2 0  A substantial  majority
of such projects  are,  like the  Cardozo project, either  run by, housed  at,  or
116  Stephen  B.  Bright,  Will  the  Death Penalty Remain  Alive  In  the  Twenty-First
Century?: International  Norms, Discrimination,  Arbitrariness,  and the Risk of Executing the
Innocent, 2001  Wis. L. REv.  1 (2001).
117  See Warden, supra note 67, at 422 app. A.
118  See Thomas Adcock, Innocence Project  Expanding Its Horizons, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec.
29, 2003,  at 9 (project claims responsibility for 140 exonerations).
119  See  The  Innocence  Project,  at  http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/index.php
(listing  innocence projects by state).
120  See  Daniel  S.  Medwed,  Actual Innocents:  Considerations in Selecting Cases for a
New Innocence Project,  81  NEB. L. REV.  1097,  1106 & 1106 n.32  (2003).
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affiliated with law  schools.121  Despite  the undisputable  fact  that the work
done  by the  original  Innocence  Project  and many  of its progeny  has been
extraordinary  in  its  quality  and absolutely  breath-taking  in  its  results,  the
proliferation  of the  institutional  form  of the  law  school-based  "innocence
project" raises some troubling issues within the larger world of criminal and
capital defense.
First, consider the  effect of the existence  of such projects on attorney-
client relationships  in individual  cases  and  on the issue of client trust in  a
public defense  system more  generally.  Ellen Suni, a  law professor and co-
founder  of  the  Midwestern  Innocence  Project,  has  written  a  thoughtful
article on ethical issues raised by the distinctive relationships established by
"innocence  projects"  with their clients. 22  While the precise nature of such
relationships  varies  across  projects,  they  are  almost  always  more  limited
than full-fledged  criminal  defense  representation.  Suni's  article  addresses
and  proposes  some  solutions  to  thorny  issues  relating  to  confidentiality,
conflicts  of  interest,  and  duties  of  zealous  representation  raised  by
"innocence"  representation.  The concerns we  seek to raise here are related
to, but distinct from, those Suni addresses.  Our concerns  are not focused on
the application of existing ethical rules to  this new  form of representation;
rather,  we are worried that the proliferation of such limited representational
relationships-especially  if they  outlast  the  DNA revolution-will  create
problematic  (even  if  "ethical")  attorney-client  relationships  that  may
undermine trust in criminal defense relationships more generally.
The  most  problematic  aspects  of  the  relationships  forged  by  the
innocence projects  are their limited and conditional  nature.  Many projects
take on only those legal claims predicated on the claimant's total innocence
of the  crime charged and terminate  the  relationship if it is  determined that
the claimant  has  no colorable  innocence  claim.  Thus,  actual  or potential
clients  whose  claims  turn  out  to  be  only  partial  or  purely  legal  defenses
(that might establish that the grade of their convicted  offense  was too high
or might mitigate their punishment or might undermine only the legal rather
than the factual  basis for their conviction),  if they are not initially  screened
out by an innocence  project, may have their non-innocence  claims ignored
or abandoned mid-stream.  As Suni points out, innocence projects can avoid
or  ameliorate  ethical  issues  posed  by  such  limited  representation  by  not
taking  on  formal  representation  of a  client  at  all  or  by  delaying  formal
representation  until  the  case  is  sufficiently  screened  for  innocence  and
121  See  Jan  Stiglitz  et  al.,  The Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects
New Emerging  Role in Clinical  Legal Education,  38  CAL. W. L. REv. 413,  415 n.4 (2002).
122 See Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for Innocence Projects:  An Initial  Primer,  70
UMKC L. REv.  921  (2002).
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ensuring  that  their  clients  are  well-informed  of  the  limits  of  the
representational  relationship.1 23   But  from  the  perspective  of  the  client,
however, no matter how delayed the formal representation  or how informed
the  consent,  there is bound  to be  some misunderstanding,  disappointment,
and  sense  of betrayal-especially  given that  the vast majority  of potential
"innocence"  clients  will  be  indigent  and  unsophisticated  inmates  seeking
post-conviction  relief  without  many  other  possible  avenues  of  legal
representation.
As  innocence  projects  become  an  established  feature  of  the  post-
conviction  inmate  assistance  landscape,  individual  inmate  experiences  of
being screened  out by such projects will multiply (whether the screening is
immediate  or, more problematically,  after a period  of investigation  and/or
representation).  And, as the use of DNA evidence  becomes more  a part of
the  pre-trial  rather  than  the  post-conviction  world,  the  screening  of post-
conviction  cases  for  "innocence"  will  become  more  difficult,  time-
consuming,  and subjective,  with fewer  clear victories.  We worry  that,  in
such  a  world,  relationships  between  indigent  defendants  and  their  un-
chosen  representatives  at  all  stages  of the  criminal  process  will  become
more problematic  than they already are.  The lack of trust that already exists
between  many indigent  defendants and their  appointed representatives  will
be  exacerbated.124   Moreover,  many  defendants  may  feel  compelled,  or
more  compelled  than  they  already  do,  to  present  themselves  as  factually
innocent  to  their  attorneys,  neglecting  or  refusing  to provide  information
that might support powerful legal defenses.
The  growth  of  the  innocence  project  as  institution  may  have
repercussions  not only for the attitudes of criminal defendants  and inmates,
but also for public defenders  as well.  Former defenders who now run legal
clinics  in  law  schools  have  written compellingly  of the  need  that public
defenders  have  for sustenance  in  their  roles. 25  This  need arises  in  large
part  from  hostile  questioning  by  members  of the public-including  other
lawyers-about how defenders justify their zealous defense of the guilty:
Criminal  lawyers  cannot escape the  scorn  heaped  upon our  clients.  Some  see  us  as
indistinguishable  from  those  we  represent....  Unfortunately,  it  is  not  just  our
parents'  friends  at random social  gatherings who  think this way-it is our  friends.  It
is the people  with  whom we have  grown up,  gone  to college,  and even  gone to law
123 See id.  at 960-64.
124  See Victoria Bonilla-Argudo,  as told to Mark Pothier, The Advocate, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 9, 2005 (Magazine), at  18 (court-appointed  criminal  defense lawyer  in Boston  reporting
that indigent clients "call some of us 'public pretenders"').
125  See  Charles  J.  Ogletree,  Jr.,  Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to  Sustain
Public Defenders, 106  HARV.  L. REv.  1239  (1993);  Abbe Smith & William  Montross,  The
Calling  of Criminal  Defense, 50 MERCER  L. REv.  443 (1999).
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school-a  sad  sign  of the  values  being  taught  in  the  legal  academy  ....  There  is
seldom admiration.  More  and more,  when they come  to understand  that we represent
our clients proudly and zealously, no matter the accusation, there is contempt. 126
The  hostility  and  incomprehension  that  public  defenders  face  will
necessarily  be exacerbated  by the  growth of special-duty public  defenders
who represent  exclusively  innocent  clients.  As  one leader  of a traditional
public  defense  clinic  wryly  commented  on  the  creation  of an  innocence
project  at  his  law  school,  "What  should  we  put  over  our  door-'Guilty
Project'?"  Given the criminal justice system's desperate need to recruit and
retain  lawyers  willing  to  take  on  traditional  indigent  criminal  defense,  a
need  especially  acute  in  death  penilty  cases,  we  should  be  aware  and
concerned  about  the  impact  that  innocence  projects  might  have  on  such
recruitment  and retention.
This  concern  has  particular  bite  in  law  schools,  where  the  next
generation  of lawyers is inculcated and trained.  While innocence  clinics no
doubt  can  and do  provide  valuable  experiences  for  students, 127 their  close
connections  with  and  dependence  upon  law  schools  make  them  an  even
more  prominent  part of legal  education  than  they  are  a part of the  larger
world of criminal justice.  While  innocence  clinics  may draw in and enroll
students  who  would  not  otherwise  consider  work  relating  to  criminal
defense, we worry  that they might also  attract much of the next generation
of public  defenders,  who  will then never be trained  in the more  traditional
indigent criminal defense clinics run by law schools.  The lack of training is
less  important  than  the  lack  of  inculcation  in  the  next  generation  of
traditional criminal defense values and sustaining narratives.  We thus need
to  think  hard  about  the  motivations,  attitudes  toward  role,  and  habits  of
investigation  and  legal  analysis  that  innocence  clinics  may  inculcate  in
students.
C.  LEGITIMATION  AND ENTRENCHMENT
We  have  commented  more  extensively  elsewhere  on  the  dilemma
faced  by  death  penalty  abolitionists  that  reforms  that  may  genuinely
improve  the administration  of capital punishment  also may make  it harder
to  abolish altogether. 28  The "innocence  revolution"  presents  two specific
applications  of this more general  concern.  First, the current focus  on DNA
evidence  carries  within  it the  seeds  of later  legitimization  of a "reformed"
126  Smith & Montross, supra note  125, at 446.
127  See,  e.g.,  Medwed, supra note  120,  at  1150  (describing the  pedagogical  benefits  of
involving students in innocence project case screening).
128  See  Carol  S.  Steiker & Jordan  M.  Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative
"Reform "  of the Death Penalty?,  63  OHIO ST. L. J. 417 (2002).
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death penalty.  Second, the rhetoric of innocence is in some tension with the
deepest normative arguments against capital punishment.
The focus  of the innocence  revolution on DNA exonerations contains
three  perils  for the future.  First,  the "random audit"129 function  of current
DNA exonerations  is a time-limited phenomenon.  At the present moment,
most  highly  publicized  DNA  exonerations  are  post-trial  and  appeal,  thus
dramatically  exposing  failures  of  our  criminal  justice  process  to  make
reliable  determinations  of guilt  and supporting  advocacy  for reform of the
justice process  and  reform  or  abolition  of the  death  penalty.  Each  new
exoneration  provides  a new  swell  of support  for  such  reforms.  As  DNA
testing  becomes  more  of  an  established  part  of  the  pre-trial  process,
however, there will (thankfully) be  fewer and fewer post-trial exonerations.
This  inevitable  and  salutary  development,  however,  may  well  lead  the
public to think that the problem of innocent people on death row is "fixed,"
as there will no longer  be any  indisputable  means of post hoc proof of the
system's  fallibility.  Jim  Liebman  has  captured  this  problem  beautifully,
noting:  "What  DNA  giveth  to the  death penalty  reform  impulse...  DNA
reform can taketh away." 13 0  Liebman also presciently predicted the second
peril-the use of DNA by proponents of the death penalty to salvage capital
punishment  by  safeguarding  it  with  required  DNA  testing. 31   This  is
exactly  the route  Governor Mitt  Romney  of Massachusetts  has pursued  in
seeking to reinstate capital punishment there, as Joe Hoffmann reports from
his  work  as  co-chair  of the  Massachusetts  Governor's  Council  in  this
symposium.132  Finally, what Liebman sees as a hope for the future,  we see
as  a third peril  of the current  focus  on DNA  evidence  in the  debate  about
innocence and capital punishment.  Emphasis on the wonders of DNA fans
the  public's  hopes  and  even  expectations  that  there  are  or  soon will  be
irrefutable means,  available in all or most cases, to "prove"  truth outside of
the  costly  and  expensive  criminal  process.133  If such  means  actually  are
quickly  developed,  we  agree with  Liebman  that they  might  take  over  the
DNA  "random  audit"  function.  But  we  fear  that  public  hopes  and
expectations  may  well  outstrip  science  for  a  substantial  period  of  time,
creating  impediments  to the political  will to  pour effort  and resources  into
deep reform of the criminal justice process.
129  See Rosen, supra note 70.
130  Liebman, supra  note 50, at  549.
131 Id. at 547-48.
132 See  Joseph  L.  Hoffmann,  Protecting the Innocent:  The  Massachusetts Governor's
Council Report,  95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY  561  (2005).
133  See  Liebman,  supra note  50,  at  551  (describing  new  "Hitchcockian"  technologies
such as "Brain Fingerprinting").
[Vol. 95THE SEDUCTION OF  INNOCENCE
At  a  much  higher  level  of abstraction,  we  worry  that  the  tone  and
rhetoric  of  a  focus  on the  problem  of executing  the  innocent  in  debates
about  the  death  penalty  is  in  some  tension  with  the  deepest  normative
arguments  against  capital punishment.  Those  arguments  depend  crucially
on some notion  of the human dignity even of those who are entirely  guilty
of heinous offenses, 134 and on some limit to what we are willing to do, as a
self-governing  collective, to  even the worst  offenders.  If innocence  is cast
as the  central  problem  in  capital punishment,  then  avoiding  execution  of
innocents  becomes  the  sought-after  solution,  deflecting  the  doubts  and
hesitations  that  abolitionists  need  to  nurture  about  the  limits  of  what
extreme  sanctions should be visited on the guilty.
The obvious reply to the foregoing is that the issue of innocence  seems
to  have  a  lot  more traction  among  actual people  at this point in time  than
abstract normative arguments do, so why not use whatever seems to work at
the  moment?  The reason  to  hesitate  and perhaps  hold back just a little is
that  the  abolitionist  movement  stands  in  relation  to  the  deep  normative
arguments  against  capital  punishment  the  way  the  defense  bar  stands  in
relation  to  the Warren  Court's  vision  of criminal  procedure-each  is  the
keeper  of  a  rather  delicate,  unpopular  flame,  and  each  has  some
responsibility to preserve  the valuable parts of its legacy even as it seeks,  as
all  effective  advocates  do,  to  use  the tools  of the  moment  to  get the job
done.
CONCLUSION
Revolutions  in  action  and  in  thought  are  by  nature  hostile  to  the
discarded past.  They tend to disparage the principles of the old regime and
exaggerate  their  departures.  Change,  not  continuity,  is  valued.  The
emerging  academic,  popular,  and  political  focus  on  the  problem  of
innocence  in  the  death  penalty  has  the  hallmarks  of a  revolution  in  this
regard.  After years of relative  dormancy, the concern  surrounding the risk
of executing the  innocent  has emerged  as a defining,  perhaps  the defining
issue  in  the  national  death penalty  debate.  As  part of its  ascendancy,  the
argument  from  innocence  claims  normative  superiority  because  of the
unquestionable  values  it  serves  (who  possibly  supports  punishing  or
executing  the  innocent?).  It  also  claims  timeless  appeal,  because  any
134 See Furman  v. Georgia,  408  U.S.  238,  270 (1972)  (Brennan,  J.,  concurring)  ("The
State,  even  as  it  punishes,  must  treat  its members  with  respect  for  their intrinsic worth  as
human beings.").
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criminal  justice  system  is  inevitably  as  fallible  as  the  humans  who
implement  it.
We are genuine admirers of the advocates who have brought claims  of
innocence to light and urged widespread reform to prevent such  errors.  But
we are  also  mindful  of the  contingency  of the  argument  from  innocence.
We  do not  believe  that the  claim of normative  distinctiveness  withstands
close scrutiny.  Nor do we regard the power of the innocence concern to be
timeless; we have sought to demonstrate  that its appeal  varies with facts on
the  ground.  We  have  thus  sought  to  provide  normative  and  temporal
context  to  the  discussion  of innocence's  role  in  the  capital  punishment
debate.  We  accordingly  urge  caution  in  looking  to  the  argument  from
innocence as necessarily the strongest, either normatively  or strategically, in
seeking reform or abolition of the death penalty.